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INTRODUCTION 
The cost in human lives and suffering is so high that we all have to work 
to end violence and oppression once and for all. We have to proclaim that 
every human being is equal, in dignity, in freedom—and, as the first 
article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, we have to 
live ‘in a spirit of brotherhood’. 
~ Federico Mayor Zaragoza 
He hath disgraced me. . .scorned my nation. . . and what’s his reason? I 
am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, 
dimensions, senses, affections, passions; fed with the same food, hurt with 
the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same 
means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian 
is? If you prick us do we not bleed? If you tickle us do we not laugh? If 
you poison us do we not die? 
~ Shylock, Merchant of Venice, Act III, Scene I 
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We live amongst great injustice. In this age, more than any other, 
knowledge of the plight of those with whom we share this imperfect 
world is accessible at the click of a button. Non-governmental 
organizations strive to bring accurate, current reports of conflict, 
poverty, and human rights abuse. And yet, for many, these 
predicaments remain remote: a situation happening to others. The 
comprehension that dignity belongs to us all is lacking. As Walt 
Whitman said, “[A]s if it harm’d me, giving others the same chances 
and rights as myself—as if it were not indispensable to my own 
rights that others possess the same.”1 
A typical snapshot of the problems of our global community is 
provided by the monthly bulletin of the International Crisis Group, 
which records potential and current conflicts around the world. In 
January 2009, the conflict situation deteriorated in Israel/Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, Madagascar, Mali, and Sri Lanka. The 
situation remained unchanged in Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Basque Country, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chechnya, 
Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kashmir, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Macedonia, Mauritania, Myanmar/Burma, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Caucasus, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, 
Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Western 
Sahara, and Yemen. The only improved situations were in 
Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zimbabwe.2 
 
 
* BA/LLB (Hons) University of Auckland, New Zealand; Legal Associate at the 
New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority. The opinions expressed are my 
own, as are any errors or omissions. 
 1. WALT WHITMAN, THOUGHT (1871), reprinted in LEAVES OF GRASS: 
AUTHORITATIVE TEXTS, PREFACES, WHITMAN ON HIS ART, CRITICISM 277 (Sculley 
Bradley & Harold W. Blodgett eds., 1973). 
 2. See International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch N°66, 66 CRISISWATCH 1, 1 
(2009), http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/crisiswatch/cw_2009/cw66 
.pdf (summarizing and assessing developments in seventy locations across the 
globe). 
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This paints a grim picture, highlighting the continuing need for a 
robust, respected international human rights framework. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)3 served as the 
foundation of this framework and it continues to serve a fundamental 
role in the protection of the dignity of human beings. Sixty years 
have passed since its inception, but its relevance has yet to falter. The 
UDHR has continued to evolve and inform the international 
community’s understanding of human rights. 
This article is centered on the UDHR, and like that document, has 
dignity as its thread. It will briefly touch on the UDHR’s formation, 
with a view to determining its contemporary influence as a living 
instrument, and introduce the arguments made by certain 
commentators against its status as a universal and modern document. 
International refugee law and the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”)4 comprise the frame 
through which the impact of the UDHR will be seen and analyzed. 
This field of law is demonstrative of the ongoing norm-creating 
ability of the UDHR. Under what is known as the “human rights 
approach, international refugee law is shaped by the UDHR, as it 
plays an indispensable role in determining whether an asylum-seeker 
will be recognized as a refugee. New Zealand, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom follow this human rights approach to determining 
refugee status. The approach will be examined principally through 
the jurisprudence of the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals 
Authority insofar as it is representative of the common approach.  
I. FORMATION: SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES  
The UDHR is a product of its time. The state of the world 
following the Second World War and its utter disregard for the 
sanctity of humankind demanded a document that would record “a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”5 
Article 28 of the UDHR best encapsulates this objective, a message 
 
 3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
UDHR]. 
 4. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 
6260, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
 5. UDHR, supra note 3, pmbl. 
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which continues to resonate today: “Everyone is entitled to a social 
and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Declaration can be fully realized.”6 
Eleanor Roosevelt and her drafting committee intended the UDHR 
to articulate an accepted standard of rights that would resonate 
throughout the entire world.7 It was the first international instrument 
to attempt such a task, and in that respect its value cannot be 
understated. Roosevelt felt it was important to translate these rights 
into words, believing the act of articulation to be educational.8 She 
explained that “the conditions of our contemporary world require the 
enumeration of certain protections which the individual must have if 
he is to acquire a sense of security and dignity in his own person.”9  
Despite challenges to the UDHR’s universal relevance and 
enforceability (which will be elaborated upon below), it is commonly 
perceived as the underpinning of international human rights and 
credited as the inspiration of more than two hundred international 
human rights instruments.10 Geoffrey Robertson QC has also 
identified the influence of the UDHR on the bills of rights included 
in nearly every national constitution adopted after World War II.11 
Moreover, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”)12 and the International Covenant on Social, Economic 
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)13 expanded on the UDHR and 
translated most of its rights into legally binding form. These two 
enforceable international covenants drew on the scope and content of 
the UDHR. 
 
 6. Id. art. 28. 
 7. See Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Promise of Human Rights, 26 
FOREIGN AFF. 470, 471, 475 (1948) (explaining the Human Rights Commission 
recommended the authoring of a Bill of Human Rights in hopes that it would 
contribute to peace among nations). 
 8. See id. at 477 (aspiring also to have the UDHR improve all peoples’ 
education). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE 
FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 35 (3d ed. The New Press 2006) (1999) (noting the UDHR’s 
remarkable “contemporaneity” decades after its creation). 
 11. Id. 
 12. International Convention and Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 13. International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
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The UDHR is held in such regard for its contribution to the 
international human rights regime that the UDHR and human rights 
have become almost synonymous concepts. As Jack Donnelly has 
said, “For the purposes of international action, ‘human rights’ means 
roughly ‘what is in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’”14 
Despite such accolades, the UDHR faces criticism. The following 
section will pose those arguments that question the UDHR’s 
fulfillment of its objectives, its relevance, and its endurance.  
A. TWO CORE CHALLENGES 
1. Cultural Relativism 
During the emergence of international human rights norms, a 
debate over the universality of rights also arose.15 Cultural relativists 
began to assert that the societal and cultural norms and values of a 
nation prevail over an individual’s rights.16 These national or 
communal traditions may affect the scope or application of any given 
right.17 
It is often argued that the UDHR is distinctively Western, and 
therefore not universal.18 Relativists emphasize that classical 
“Western” notions of human rights recognize the primacy of 
individual, political, and civil rights, whereas most non-Western, 
Third World  traditions  place  greater significance on the community 
 
 
 14. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
22 (2d ed. 2003). 
 15. See Rhonda L. Callaway & Julie Harrelson-Stephens, Are Human Rights 
Universal? in EXPLORING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSENTIAL READINGS 
109, 109 (Rhonda L. Callaway & Julie Harrelson-Stephens eds., 2007) 
(juxtaposing universalists, who believe that human beings are humans first and 
members of a specific culture second, against cultural relativists). 
 16. See id. (referencing Asian, Islamic, and African cultures as the most 
prominent locales of support for the primacy of local, societal values). 
 17. See id. (acknowledging that such traditions may modify or even reduce a 
given right). 
 18. See DONNELLY, supra note 14, at 27 (explaining that Soviet bloc leaders 
consistently rejected the legitimacy of civil and political rights, while Western 
philosophers and the United States government denigrated economic and social 
rights); see also id. at 22 & n.2 (calling the contention that UDHR values are 
Western “problematic,” especially in light of the fact that significant contributors 
in the drafting process were from Lebanon, China, Chile, and the USSR). 
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basis of human rights, the duties attached to economic and social 
rights, and the relative character of human rights.19 
Bonny Ibhawoh, in an excellent and succinct analysis, put forward 
three characteristics of Western civilizations which may lead to a 
questioning of the universality of human rights.20 Cultural relativists’ 
argue that these and other such distinctly Western features mean that 
certain so-called “universal” rights may not fit comfortably within 
non-Western societies with different world-views and values.21 The 
three characteristics common among Western communities are: 
1. The individual is considered the fundamental unit of 
society, as opposed to the idea of society as founded on a 
familial or collective basis; 
2. “[H]uman existence in society” is secured through the 
language of rights rather than conceptualized as duty-
driven; 
3. The principal method used to secure rights is the 
adversarial legal process, where rights are asserted and 
adjudicated, rather than the realization of rights through 
restorative methods such as reconciliation or education.22 
Following on from these characteristics is the argument by some 
advocates of cultural relativism against the hierarchy of rights—
essentially a challenge to the dominance of civil and political rights.23 
Given that the overriding concern in many parts of the world is 
access to basic social and economic rights, this is a vital issue to 
 
 19. See Bonny Ibhawoh, Defining Persecution and Protection: The Cultural 
Relativism Debate and the Rights of Refugees, in PROBLEMS OF PROTÉCTION: THE 
UNHCR, REFUGEES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61, 63, 67 (Niklaus Steiner et al. eds., 
2003) (noting that the dispute over the primacy of certain rights has carried over 
even to the way refugee rights are defined and interpreted). 
 20. Id. at 63. 
 21. See id. (calling such Western values “ill suited” for non-Western societies). 
 22. See id. (observing several commentators’ attempts to temper the vigor of 
cultural relativists by arguing that some rights are not suited for universality or 
inalienability). 
 23. See id. at 66-67 (describing the debate over whether it is appropriate to 
prioritize certain rights over others, or whether all rights should be accorded equal 
weight and stating that several writers have recognized that civil and political 
rights have taken precedence over social, economic, and cultural rights). 
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proponents of cultural relativism.24 Therefore, a cultural relativist 
will advance the argument that the UDHR reflects only Western 
liberal values, especially in its bias towards civil and political 
rights.25 In this regard it may be noted that only six of the twenty-five 
paragraphs dealing with specific rights in the UDHR possess an 
economic, social, or cultural character.26  
The perceived dominance of Western attitudes is often attributed 
to the drafting process. However, this is arguably refutable upon 
closer examination. The committee that contributed to the final draft 
of the UDHR consisted of a group of delegates of very diverse 
origin.27 As Robertson notes, over half of the fifty-six-state General 
Assembly members were Asian, African and Latin American.28 The 
UDHR passed without a dissenting vote, although there were eight 
abstentions: Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi 
Arabia, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Union of South Africa, and 
Yugoslavia.29 However, the communist abstaining States had no 
issue with the substantive provisions on individual rights. Their 
objection was a politically motivated response to the perceived 
favoring of democracy in the UDHR.30 
Although there is a quantitative imbalance in the UDHR between 
civil and political rights on the one hand and economic and social 
rights on the other, it does attempt to incorporate socio-economic 
rights, including the right to work and to access an adequate standard 
 
 24. See id. at 67 (highlighting that civil and political rights are of little use to 
those who are unable first to feed and clothe themselves). 
 25. See id. (pinpointing Western society’s orientation toward individualism as 
explicative of its preference for civil and political rights). 
 26. UDHR, supra note 3, arts. 22-27. 
 27. See ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 37 (explaining that Chinese, Indian, 
Lebanese, Chilean, Egyptian, and Iranian representatives played significant roles in 
the drafting process). 
 28. Id. (“[F]ourteen members . . . were Asian, four were African and twenty 
came from Latin America.”). 
 29. See RHONA K. M. SMITH, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
36 (3d ed. 2007) (positing that any significance accorded to these abstentions has 
eroded with the passage of fifty years and the world’s increasing trust in the 
UDHR). 
 30. See ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 37 (noting that the word “democracy” is 
mentioned only once in the UDHR in an effort to mitigate the fears of the 
communist abstainers). 
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of living—aspects of which include health, housing, and education.31 
Moreover, with the advent of viewpoints asserting the indivisibility 
of human rights,32 one can regard the UDHR holistically. Its very 
nature means that “the value of each right is significantly augmented 
by the presence of many others,” rendering the tallying of rights 
according to quantity in a particular category an empty exercise.33 
In opposition to cultural relativism is a school of thought that 
questions whether relativism retains plausibility in the face of 
atrocity. The argument is that a cruel act is cruel to any human being 
to whom it is done, and the UDHR, in trying to be universal, is 
propagating the message that “every human being is sacred,” not just 
those that are white or Christian, for example.34 Article 2 of the 
UDHR makes the connection that the inviolability of a person does 
not depend on his or her, “race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.”35 
The following is an account of the recently reignited conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, where most parties to the 
conflict have utilized sexual violence as a weapon.36 Human Rights 
Watch recorded a mother describing the treatment of her twenty-
year-old daughter: 
They went after my daughter, and I knew they would rape 
her. But she resisted and said she would rather die than have 
relations with them. They cut off her left breast and put it in 
her hand. They said, “Are you still resisting us?” She said she 
would rather die than be with them. They cut off her genital 
 
 31. See id. (arguing that, for this reason, there is “little merit” to the idea that 
the UDHR upholds only liberal Western values). 
 32. See, e.g., World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 
1993) (“All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated.”). 
 33. DONNELLY, supra note 14, at 27. 
 34. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 59 
(1998) (explaining that any alternative conception of human rights would lead to 
the conclusion that certain peoples are not sacred and not true humans). 
 35. UDHR, supra note 3, art. 2. 
 36. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR: SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS IN EASTERN CONGO 23 (2002) (describing 
the use of sexual violence as a means of gaining and preserving control over 
people and the property that they owned or lived on). 
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labia and showed them to her. She said, “Please kill me.” 
They took a knife and put it to her neck and then made a long 
vertical incision down her chest and split her body open. She 
was crying but finally she died. She died with her breast in 
her hand.37 
If we were to choose other parts of the world, there would be 
similar tales of horror. For example:  
The torture techniques in Baghdad were routine and varied in 
severity. The electric shocks could be everywhere. But 
sometimes they would burn people on the genitals and go on 
burning until they were completely burned off. They did the 
same with toes. . . . I saw one man and they had used an iron 
on his stomach. They used drills and made holes in bones, 
arms and legs. . . . There was another torture where they 
would put sulphuric acid in a tub. They would take a man and 
start by dissolving his hands.38 
These are just a couple of examples of shocking brutality that have 
been and continue to be enacted in countless other places, times, and 
situations. In places and times where such unspeakable acts occur, 
does it matter that the UDHR has a strong focus on individual rights? 
This author does not believe so. As Professor Rosalyn Higgins 
eloquently explains:  
Human rights are rights held simply by virtue of being a 
human person. They are part and parcel of the integrity and 
dignity of the human being. They are thus rights that cannot 
be given or withdrawn at will by any domestic legal 
system. . . . It is sometimes suggested that there can be no 
fully universal concept of human rights, for it is necessary to 
take into account the diverse cultures and political systems of 
the world. In my view this is a point advanced mostly by 
states, and by liberal scholars anxious not to impose the 
Western view of things on others. It is rarely advanced by the 
oppressed, who are only too anxious to benefit from 
perceived universal standards. The non-universal, relativist 
view of human rights is in fact a very state-centred view and 
loses sight of the fact that human rights are human rights and 
 
 37. Id. at 55 (explaining that some “rapists react with extraordinary cruelty” 
when their victims attempt resistance). 
 38. ROBERT FISK, THE GREAT WAR FOR CIVILISATION: THE CONQUEST OF THE 
MIDDLE EAST 155-56 (2005). 
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not dependent on the fact that states, or groupings of states, 
may behave differently from each other so far as their 
politics, economic policy, and culture are concerned. I 
believe, profoundly, in the universality of the human spirit. 
Individuals everywhere want the same essential things: to 
have sufficient food and shelter; to be able to speak freely; to 
practise their own religion or to abstain from religious belief; 
to feel that their person is not threatened by the state; to know 
that they will not be tortured, or detained without charge, and 
that, if charged, they will have a fair trial. I believe there is 
nothing in these aspirations that is dependent upon culture, or 
religion, or stage of development. They are as keenly felt by 
the African tribesman as by the European city-dweller, by the 
inhabitant of a Latin American shanty-town as by the resident 
of a Manhattan apartment.39 
However, it is acknowledged that due to the hierarchical 
classification of rights, and the lesser duties owed by states regarding 
economic and social rights, an imbalance between the two categories 
of rights remains. The UDHR’s enduring relevance may depend on 
its ability to adapt to an increasing emphasis on socio-economic 
rights, to ensure it remains in touch with how best to serve the cause 
of human dignity. The subject of socio-economic rights is broached 
in subsequent sections.  
2. Enforceability 
International law binds states only to the extent that they agree to 
be bound. That states are often unwilling to recognize the authority 
of international law has proven a key obstacle in attempts to expand 
its scope.40 James Hathaway has identified the fear that “the gap 
between declared universal law and the practice of states [is] 
widen[ing].”41 This criticism of the UDHR is compounded by its 
status as a U.N. General Assembly Resolution, with no legally 
binding force. 
 
 39. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
HOW WE USE IT 96-97 (1994) (emphasis in original). 
 40. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-32 (2005) (hypothesizing that an expansive views of 
international human rights dissuades states from acknowledging their legitimacy 
because states will view those rights as mere rhetoric). 
 41. Id. at 31. 
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However, as noted earlier, the two subsequent Covenants do have 
this force. The UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR combine to form 
the International Bill of Rights, which suffers less vulnerability to 
challenges based on enforceability. As Hathaway goes on to state:  
More than any other gauge, the International Bill of Rights is 
essential to an understanding of the minimum duty owed by a 
state to its nationals. Its place derives from the extraordinary 
consensus achieved on the soundness of its standards, its 
regular invocation by states, and its role as the progenitor for 
the many more specific human rights accords.42  
The next two sections attempt to use refugee law to evaluate the 
strength of these criticisms and to test the contemporary normative 
impact of the UDHR. Specifically, the following sections will ask 
whether the UDHR has law-making abilities, whether it is 
enforceable, and whether the imbalance between civil and political 
rights and economic, social, and cultural rights is being addressed.  
II. THE UDHR AND THE REFUGEE CONVENTION 
International refugee law is a specialized field of law presenting its 
own share of challenges. This article cannot traverse the breadth of 
the law to provide comprehensive coverage of its issues, but does 
attempt to convey fundamental principles of refugee law where they 
intersect the UDHR. 
There is a unique interrelationship between the UDHR (and the 
entire International Bill of Rights) and the Refugee Convention. 
Approximately eighty-six percent of the refugees in the world live in 
states that have signed or ratified the ICESCR and ICCPR.43 
Furthermore, the human rights agreements and the Refugee 
Convention set overlapping guarantees. Therefore, as James 
 
 42. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 106-07 (Anne Lynas 
Shah ed., 1991) (emphasis added) (asserting that having an International Bill of 
Rights is “consistent” with the aims of the UDHR). 
 43. See HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 40, at 9 (comparing this number to the sixty-eight percent of refugees 
living in a state party to the Refugee Convention or Protocol, and also observing 
that, of those states party to the Refugee Convention or Protocol, ninety-eight 
percent are party to at least one of the component instruments of the International 
Bill of Rights). 
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Hathaway recognizes, refugee rights will oftentimes entail a 
combination of principles stemming from both refugee law and the 
International Bill of Rights.44 Moreover, the dominant approach to 
determining key aspects of the refugee definition is known as the 
“human rights approach” and draws extensively on the UDHR. 
A person will be recognized as a refugee if they meet the inclusion 
clause of the Refugee Convention, Article 1A(2), being someone 
who,  
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.45 
The “being persecuted” aspect of the definition is undefined in the 
Refugee Convention. However, in a recent decision, the New 
Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority (“RSAA”) discussed 
three interpretative approaches that have been identified in various 
jurisdictions.46 The first approach applies the domestic rules and 
norms of the country of asylum in order to ascertain whether an 
individual is being persecuted.47 However, the RSAA concluded that 
this was “undesirable in the context of an international human rights 
treaty which must be interpreted and applied according to 
international, not domestic standards.”48 It would also too easily 
allow “the intrusion of ideology and also the implication of censure 
of the state of origin.”49 The second approach uses dictionary 
definitions to aid interpretation.50 However, this has rightly been 
 
 44. See id. (noting that the convergence of refugee law and human rights 
principles occurs in practice as well as in principle.). 
 45. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(A)(2). 
 46. Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, ¶¶ 37-42 (July 7, 2004) (N.Z. Refugee 
Status App. Auth.), available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/REF_ 
20040707_74665.pdf. 
 47. Id. ¶ 38. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. ¶ 39. 
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rejected as it exposes the problems that arise with the various 
meanings of individual words, and fails to contextualize the meaning 
given to a phrase.51 The third approach is the “human rights 
approach,” and although not universally accepted, it is the dominant 
approach.52  
“Being persecuted” involves two key elements: a “risk of serious 
harm and a failure of state protection.”53 An assessment of possible 
breaches of human rights may inform either the existence of serious 
harm or the existence of state protection. This is the “human rights 
approach.” Hathaway thus described the human rights approach: 
“refugee law ought to concern itself with actions which deny human 
dignity in any key way, and . . . the sustained or systemic denial of 
core human rights is the appropriate standard.”54 Moreover, in 
another paper Hathaway wrote regarding the role of the judiciary, he 
argues that relying on core norms of international human rights law 
to define the serious harm aspect of being persecuted is both legally 
compelling and pragmatic.55 He states:  
[I]nternational human rights law provides refugee law judges 
with an automatic means—within the framework of legal 
positivism and continuing accountability—to contextualize 
and update standards in order to take new problems into 
account. Because international human rights law is constantly 
being authoritatively interpreted through a combination of 
general comments, decisions on individual petitions, and 
declarations of UN plenary bodies, there is a wealth of 
wisdom upon which refugee decision makers can draw to 
keep the Convention refugee definition alive in changing 
circumstances. This malleability or flexibility of international 
human rights law makes it possible for you to address new 
 
 51. See id. (pointing out that because language is not precise, different judges 
may understand the so-called “plain meaning” of a word differently). 
 52. See id. ¶ 41 (explaining that this approach is rooted in established rules of 
treaty interpretation). 
 53. Id. ¶ 53 (emphasis in original). 
 54. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 108. 
 55. See James C. Hathaway, The Relationship Between Human Rights and 
Refugee Law: What Refugee Law Judges Can Contribute, in THE REALITIES OF 
REFUGEE DETERMINATION ON THE EVE OF A NEW MILLENNIUM: THE ROLE OF THE 
JUDICIARY 80, 86 (Jordan, Nesbitt & Assocs. Ltd. ed., 1999) (believing the 
International Bill of Rights to be a foundational, though not absolute, basis for 
informing the evaluation of what constitutes persecution). 
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threats to human dignity through refugee law, but to do so 
without asserting either subjective or legally ungrounded 
perceptions of “what’s right, and what’s wrong.”56 
The courts in Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as the New 
Zealand RSAA have accepted this approach. In Canada, the Supreme 
Court recognized Hathaway’s description of the approach in Canada 
v. Ward,57 with the United Kingdom House of Lords following suit in 
Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.58 
Refugee Appeal No. 74665 asked the immediate follow-up 
question posed by the human rights approach, when the RSAA 
stated: “Recognising that ‘being persecuted’ may be defined as the 
sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative 
of a failure of state protection, the question which arises is how one 
identifies ‘basic human rights.’”59 The RSAA immediately 
established that customary international law would be of little 
assistance, given the notoriously difficult task of identifying 
sufficient state practice and opinio juris.60 As such, the RSAA 
confirmed that “treaty law provides a more solid and compelling 
legal foundation.”61 The RSAA, many other national superior courts 
and adjudicative bodies, and leading refugee academic Hathaway 
overwhelmingly consider the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR to 
be the treaty sources that provide the most solid authority.62 
 
 56. Id. at 85-86 (listing two other reasons justifying the reliance on the 
International Bill of Rights, including first, the idea that because states determine 
what international law is, it makes sense to enforce states’ own definition; and 
second, the notion that by relying on internationally agreed-upon standards, 
“refugee decision makers . . . are not combating the views of [individual] 
governments”). 
 57. See Canada v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 733-34 (Can.) (citing 
Hathaway’s words as a succinct explanation of how the underlying commitment to 
human rights shapes refugee law). 
 58. See Horvath v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, (2001) 1 A.C. 489, 495 
(H.L.) (U.K.) (invoking Hathaway’s ideas in attempting to define the limits of 
“persecution” in the context of the Refugee Convention). 
 59. Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, ¶ 62 (July 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/REF_20040707_74665.pdf. 
 60. See id. ¶ 63 (expressing doubt over the usefulness of custom in ascertaining 
fundamental human rights). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. ¶ 65 (emphasizing that the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR are meant 
to be read together). 
ANDERSON_TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2010  10:12 AM 
2009] ON DIGNITY 129 
In addition to its reputation, the rationale behind the UDHR’s 
status as the first port of call is the ordinary principles of treaty 
interpretation encapsulated by the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (“VCLT”).63 Article 31(1) of the VCLT mandates that, “[a] 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”64  
A treaty’s “context” as defined in Article 31(2) of the VCLT 
includes the preamble.65 The preamble is expressly designated a 
principal source of a treaty’s objects and purposes.66 The first two 
paragraphs of the Refugee Convention’s preamble disclose the 
human rights purpose of the treaty, and specifically refer to the 
UDHR.67   
As the RSAA recognized in Refugee Appeal No. 74665, the 
preamble to the Refugee Convention is referred to in two important 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) 
documents.68 It can be found in the UNHCR Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status69 and in 
UNHCR’s Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to 
 
 63. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), opened for signature 
May 23, 1969, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 92-12, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. art. 31(2) (“The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a 
treaty shall comprise . . . the text, including its preamble and annexes . . . .”). 
 66. See id.; see also Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in 
Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176, 196 (Aug. 27) (using the Madrid 
Convention’s preamble in determining that Convention’s objects and purposes); 
Asylum (Colom. v. Peru) 1950 I.C.J. 266, 282 (Nov. 20) (using the Havana 
Convention’s preamble in determining that Convention’s objects and purposes). 
 67. See Refugee Convention, supra note 4, pmbl. (“Considering that the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
approved on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly have affirmed the 
principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without 
discrimination . . . .”). 
 68. See Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, ¶ 57 (July 7, 2004) (emphasizing that 
both documents acknowledge the preamble’s significance). 
 69. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Handbook on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. 
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 1992) (noting that the granting of asylum is not 
elaborated upon in the Refugee Convention, though it is referenced in the 
preamble). 
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the Status of Refugees.70 The RSAA notes that the second of these 
two documents “accepts that human rights principles should inform 
the interpretation of the refugee definition, as should the ongoing 
development of international human rights law.”71 
There are four types of rights within the International Bill of 
Rights which form a hierarchy of rights for the purposes of 
determining the presence of persecution in refugee law.72 These 
rights clarify the extent of the obligation of protection which the state 
will owe its citizen. First are those rights in the UDHR which are 
non-derogable.73 Examples of such rights include freedom from 
being “arbitrarily deprived of . . . life,”74 and protection from “torture 
or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”75 
Because of the importance of these rights, the failure to guarantee 
them constitutes persecution.76 Second are the rights in the UDHR 
and ICCPR from which states may derogate in a public emergency.77 
Some examples are “freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention” and 
“the protection of personal and family privacy.”78 Failure to 
guarantee such rights will usually breach a state’s duty to protect, 
except in case of emergency.79 Third are the economic, social, and 
 
 70. See UNHCR, Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, ¶ 4 (Apr. 1, 2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
docid/3b20a3914.html (pointing out that the Refugee Convention’s preamble 
utilizes language strongly supporting human rights ideals). 
 71. Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, ¶ 57 (July 7, 2004). 
 72. See HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 108 
(implying that these four categories help determine which rights “are appropriately 
considered to be basic and inalienable”). 
 73. See id. at 109 (commenting that these rights gained binding force upon 
inclusion in the ICCPR). 
 74. ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 6. 
 75. Id. art. 7; see also HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 
42, at 109 (listing other such non-derogable rights found in the UDHR). 
 76. See HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 109 
(stressing that even compelling national emergencies will not justify derogation 
from these rights). 
 77. See ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 4(1) (specifying that such a public 
emergency must be “officially proclaimed” and “threaten[] the life of the nation” 
before derogation is permitted). 
 78. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 109 (internal 
citations omitted); ICCPR, supra note 12, arts. 9-10, 17, 23. 
 79. See HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 110 
(stipulating that the government’s actions also must be strictly necessary, not 
inconsistent with other mandates of international law, and not discriminatorily 
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cultural rights of the UDHR and the ICESCR, including, inter alia, 
“the right to work, . . . entitlement to food, clothing, housing, 
medical care, . . . and basic education.”80 At a certain point, depriving 
an individual of particularly important socio-economic rights will be 
the functional equivalent of depriving that individual of life or 
subjecting that individual to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment.81 As a result, such deprivation of rights would be 
considered persecution.82 Fourth in the hierarchy are certain rights in 
the UDHR that were not carried over to the ICCPR or ICESCR, 
meaning that they may fall beyond the ambit of the state’s obligation 
to protect its citizens.83 This category contains “[t]he right to own 
and be free from arbitrary deprivation of property.”84  
The RSAA has applied the human rights approach to persecution 
in different contexts including sexual orientation,85 and gender based 
persecution.86 In Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93 Re GJ, the appellant 
was a homosexual Iranian man.87 A principal issue was whether 
sexual orientation could be the basis for finding persecution related 
to membership of a particular social group (fear of persecution due to 
group membership being one of the five reasons for refugee status 
 
executed). 
 80. Id. at 110-11 (internal citations omitted); ICESCR, supra note 13, arts. 6, 
11(1), 13-14. 
 81. See HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 111 
(providing as examples of such key socio-economic rights, “the ability to earn a 
living, or the entitlement to food, shelter, or health care. . .”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. at 111 (concluding that, standing alone, violations of these rights 
will not amount to persecution). 
 84. Id.; UDHR, supra note 3, art. 17. 
 85. See Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 61 (Aug. 30, 1995) (N.Z. Refugee 
Status App. Auth.), available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_ 
19950830_1312.pdf (granting refugee status based on discrimination the appellant 
faced as a homosexual man in Iran). 
 86. See, e.g., Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, ¶¶ 104-08 (Aug. 16, 2000) (N.Z. 
Refugee Status App. Auth.), available at 
http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/ 
Ref_20000816_71427.pdf (elaborating that women are “fundamentally 
disenfranchised and marginalised” by the Iranian government); Refugee Appeal 
No. 2039/93, ¶ 144 (Feb. 12, 1996) (N.Z. Refugee App. Auth.), available at 
http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_19960212_2039.pdf (holding that 
an Iranian woman met the requirements for refugee status in part because of the 
oppression she faced from her male relatives). 
 87. Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 4 (Aug. 30, 1995). 
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according to the Inclusion Clause of the Refugee Convention).88 To 
qualify as a “particular social group,” there must exist “an internal 
defining characteristic shared by members of the particular social 
group.”89 This occurs when “there is a shared defining characteristic 
that is either innate or unchangeable, or if voluntary association is 
involved, where that association is for reasons so fundamental to the 
human dignity of members of the group that they should not be 
forced to foresake the association.”90 The RSAA acknowledged the 
application of the human rights approach in this interpretation of 
“particular social group” when it stated:  
In this way, recognition is given to the principle that refugee 
law ought to concern itself with actions which deny human 
dignity in any key way . . . . On this interpretation, the issue 
of sexual orientation presents little difficulty. As we have 
earlier remarked, sexual orientation is a characteristic which 
is either innate or unchangeable or so fundamental to identity 
or to human dignity that the individual should not be forced 
to foresake or change the characteristic.91 
Although neither the UDHR nor the ICCPR make any provision 
for the freedom to choose sexual orientation, the anti-discrimination 
provisions of these two agreements are sufficiently broad to embrace 
this choice.92 Article 2 of each instrument articulates that all parties 
are equal before the law and are entitled—without any 
discrimination—to the equal protection of the law.93 As a result, “the 
 
 88. See id. (commenting that the Authority delayed handing down its decision 
in the case in part because the appellant failed to provide adequate information 
regarding the social group classification at issue); see also Refugee Convention, 
supra note 4, art. 1(A)(2) (granting refugee status to those with a “well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons for race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion”). 
 89. Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 61 (Aug. 30, 1995). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (citations omitted). 
 92. See, e.g., id. at 39 (explaining that the Tasmanian government 
acknowledged sexual orientation is within the meaning of “other status” in Article 
2(1) of the ICCPR). 
 93. See UDHR, supra note 3, art. 2 (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without discrimination of any kind . . . .”); 
ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 2(1) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals . . . the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind . . . .”). 
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law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons 
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”94 
Refugee decision-makers have interpreted the anti-discrimination 
provisions to include homosexuality, as it is acknowledged “that 
[lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender] persons are entitled to all 
human rights on an equal basis with others.”95 Moreover, as the 
RSAA has accepted, the prohibition by law of private, consensual 
homosexual acts violates the right to privacy articulated by Article 
17 of the ICCPR.96 Therefore, in such cases, core human rights 
would be violated.  
Refugee Appeal No. 2039/9397 confronted gender-based 
persecution where the appellant claimed that, as an Arab woman, she 
suffered oppression within her family, and from society as a whole.98 
The RSAA summarized her case as one that relied on the following 
four grounds:  
(a) Her race and religion.  
(b) Her family background and the political activities of 
family members. 
(c) The oppression of female members of her family by male 
family members. 
(d) The oppression of women in Iranian society.99 
The appellant’s principal claims were ordered according to the 
hierarchy of rights in the ICCPR. She feared violation of the 
following rights:  
 
 94. ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 26. 
 95. UNHCR, Protection Policy and Legal Advice Section, UNHCR Guidance 
Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 6 
(Nov. 21, 2008). 
 96. See id. at 10 (elaborating upon the notion that “[t]he very existence of such 
laws,” even where those laws are only narrowly enforced and/or carry limited 
penalties could greatly impede “LGBT persons’ enjoyment of their fundamental 
human rights”). 
 97. Refugee Appeal No. 2039/93 (Feb. 12, 1996) (N.Z. Refugee Status App. 
Auth.). 
 98. Id. ¶ 3. 
 99. See id. ¶¶ 3-4 (adding that the appellant argued alternatively that the 
Authority should consider the cumulative effect of the claims to determine whether 
her fear of persecution was well-founded). 
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First Level Rights 
Article 6: “The arbitrary deprivation of her life” by her male 
relatives. 
Article 7: “Torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment” at the hands of male family members. 
Article 18: “The right to freedom of thought and conscience.” 
 
Second Level Rights 
Article 19: “The right to freedom of opinion and expression.” 
Article 17: “Right to privacy.” 
Article 23: “No marriage without free and full consent; 
equality of rights.”100  
The RSAA agreed that, “the concept of persecution is broad 
enough to include governmental measures that compel [conduct] . . . 
abhorrent to that individual’s deepest beliefs.”101 In assessing 
whether a female claimant faces persecution, proper weight must be 
given to the significance of her “being required to comply with codes 
and requirements fundamentally at odds with [her] own conscience 
and beliefs or deeply held convictions, or to engage in conduct that is  
abhorrent to [her] own beliefs,” even where those beliefs are not 
necessarily religious beliefs.102 
In coming to this conclusion, the RSAA emphasized the ICCPR’s 
Article 18 right to freedom of opinion and expression, stating: 
This Article is directly relevant to the appellant’s deeply held 
views of her right to function as an autonomous and 
independent individual, to her passionate opposition, both to 
the patriarchal society comprising her extended Arab family, 
and to the male domination of women in Iranian society at 
large. Additionally, . . . the right under ICCPR Article 18 of 
spiritual and moral existence is closely associated with the 
 
 100. Id. ¶¶ 81-86. 
 101. Id. ¶ 97 (quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993)). The 
RSAA further noted that 
[W]hen a person with religious views different from those espoused by a religious 
regime is required to conform to, or is punished for failing to comply with, laws that 
are fundamentally abhorrent to that person’s deeply held religious convictions, the 
resulting anguish should be considered in determining whether the authorities have 
engaged in persecutorial conduct. 
Id. 
 102. Id. ¶ 99. 
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right to privacy in ICCPR Article 17, as well as (private) 
freedom of opinion in ICCPR Article 19(1). But the  right to 
freedom of thought and conscience under Article 18 means 
the right to develop autonomously thoughts and a conscience 
free from impermissible external influence. 103 
 In addition to the preceding cases involving civil and political 
rights, refugee law and the UDHR can combine to vindicate the 
social and economic elements of those universal rights that are 
essential to human dignity.104 This connection to dignity is often 
understated. Therefore, socio-economic rights may represent a 
worthy channel for the law-making abilities of the UDHR. Judge de 
Visscher of the International Court of Justice has classified 
lawmaking treaties as “treaties the object of which is the laying down 
of common rules of conduct (normes de conduite communes).”105 
This avenue will be explored in the remainder of this article.  
III. EVOLUTION IN TRAIN: SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS IN REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION 
As indicated previously, social and economic rights rank third on 
the hierarchy of rights, indicating serious harm and a lack of state 
protection such as to engage the refugee protection regime. There are 
significant qualifications attached to a finding of refugee status 
related to breaches of this group of rights. Protection may only be 
engaged where there is a discriminatory denial of available resources 
or a failure to provide the most basic of necessities despite the state’s 
fiscal ability to do so.106 This is because the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
differ significantly in certain conceptual ways; the duty of the state 
party under the ICESCR is not to “respect and ensure” the realization 
 
 103. Id. ¶ 81 (citation omitted). 
 104. See HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 111 
(noting that the denial of fundamental socio-economic rights, such as the right to 
food or shelter, can rise to the level of persecution). 
 105. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 40, at 72 n.218. 
 106. See HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 110-
11(highlighting that the ICESCR requires only that states “take steps to the 
maximum of their available resources to progressively realize rights,” rather than a 
pronouncing an absolute standard that states must meet). 
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of rights, as is the standard demanded under the ICCPR.107 Rather, 
the ICESCR requires only that a state party work actively and 
earnestly toward recognition of the enumerated rights to the 
maximum extent that available resources allow.108 As the RSAA has 
explained, economic and social rights are limited in that “the scarcity 
of resources which any human community has to reckon with” 
qualifies the extent of the state’s duty to its citizens.109 
However, the human rights approach to refugee law (made 
possible through the reference to the UDHR in the Refugee 
Convention’s Preamble) may enable the broadening of the scope of 
applicability of socio-economic rights. As Michelle Foster has 
articulated it: 
Given that [the UDHR] sets out both civil and political rights, 
and economic and social rights, and in light of the general 
position in international law regarding the indivisibility of the 
two sets of rights, this development [the human rights 
approach] holds considerable potential for extending the 
application of the Refugee Convention to claims based on 
deprivations of economic and social rights.110 
The traditional, conservative position has meant that successful 
refugee claims were mainly limited to cases involving “economic 
proscription,” that is, an almost complete denial of the ability to earn 
a living.  
 
 
 107. See Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, ¶ 87 (July 7, 2004) (N.Z. Refugee 
Status App. Auth.) (characterizing the rights guaranteed by the ICESCR as more 
“context-dependent” than hose secured by the ICCPR). 
 108. Compare ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 2(1) (“Each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take steps, . . . to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant . . . .”), with ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 2(1) 
(“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant . . . .”). 
 109. Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, ¶ 87 (July 7, 2004) (citing CHRISTIAN 
TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 39 (2003)) 
(acknowledging that, for this reason, the duties state parties owe to citizens can 
never be stated absolutely). 
 110. MICHELLE FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS: REFUGE FROM DEPRIVATION 16-17 (2007). 
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Early RSAA jurisprudence displays this conservative position. In 
Refugee Appeal No. 70863/98,111 an Iranian woman appellant was 
directed by the Komiteh (revolutionary guards) to stop working as a 
hairdresser.112 The RSAA identified Article 23 of the UDHR and 
Article 6(1) of the ICESCR as the relevant rights and explained that 
the two Articles “conceptualise work as being integral to the 
attainment of a decent living.”113 The effect of this classification 
meant that the RSAA had a relatively narrow view of exclusion from 
employment.  
That narrow view was that it is possible to establish persecution 
only where individuals were “prevented from securing any 
employment or where the only work which [can be attained] is, for 
example[,] of an extremely dangerous nature or grossly out of 
keeping with [an individual’s] qualifications and experience.”114 In 
the instant case, the economic consequences on the whole were 
deemed not to be “so detrimental as to amount to persecution,” as 
there was “no blanket exclusion from pursuing alternative 
employment.”115 
The RSAA did recognize that, aside from being the means of 
funding an acceptable standard of living, work “has a personal and 
social dimension which is closely related to the realisation of self 
worth and dignity.”116 The RSAA acknowledged that the appellant 
had been forced out of the career she had chosen for herself. 
However, as socio-economic rights are concerned with minimum 
standards, it went on to explain that “[n]ot every breach of a 
 
 111. Refugee Appeal No. 70863/98 (Aug.13, 1998) (N.Z. Refugee Status App. 
Auth.) available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_19980813_ 
70863.pdf. 
 112. See generally id. (denying refugee status to the appellant despite her claims 
that she was forced to abandon her profession). 
 113. See id. at 8 (recognizing, additionally, that ICESCR Article 11 protects the 
right to an “adequate standard of living”); see also UDHR, supra note 3, art. 23 
(right to work); ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 6(1) (same). 
 114. Refugee Appeal No. 70863/98, at 8 (Aug.13, 1998) (citing HATHAWAY, 
THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 133) (emphasis added). 
 115. Id. (concluding that the appellant had not worked in the beginning of her 
marriage and therefore the income must not be essential to enjoying an acceptable 
standard of living). 
 116. Id. at 9 (concluding that the appellant’s efforts in training and establishing 
her own business reflected a level of personal enjoyment above and beyond the 
simple satisfaction of receiving compensation). 
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claimant’s human rights constitutes persecution.”117 The RSAA 
believed that the appellant had not invested sufficient time in her 
occupation such that “any proscription on following [her chosen] 
profession [would be] particularly onerous.”118 Therefore, there was 
no real chance of serious harm.  
Michelle Foster has stated that until recently, “the jurisprudence 
remained fairly undeveloped . . . particularly in respect of aspects of 
economic and social rights other than the right to work.”119 She 
believes that national and international adjudicative bodies are now 
“displaying an increasing willingness to hold governments 
responsible for practices that involve a breach of those rights.”120  
These developments have led to socio-economic claims commonly 
being successful where several less severe violations accrue in such a 
way as to amount to persecution.121 In Refugee Appeal No. 
71193/98,122 the RSAA granted refugee status to a Roma family from 
the Czech Republic who had experienced severe discrimination in 
employment, provision of health care and housing, and the education 
of their children, and would face the same upon return.123 Again, the 
RSAA acknowledged the dignity aspect of these types of claims. 
Significant weight was given to the effect on the appellants of their 




 117. Id. (referencing Hathaway, who argues that persecution results only from 
the denial of the “minimally accepted standards” of economic, social, and cultural 
rights). 
 118. Id. (finding the fact that the appellant had worked in this profession for 
only eighteen months and had trained for only three months particularly relevant). 
 119. FOSTER, supra note 110, at 91. 
 120. Id. at 18-19. 
 121. See id. at 104-05 (observing that this amalgamative tactic clouds the ability 
to distinguish the violation of any single right, standing alone, as sufficient to 
constitute persecution). 
 122. Refugee Appeal No. 71193/98 (Sept. 9, 1999) (N.Z. Refugee Status App. 
Auth.) available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_19990909_ 
71193.pdf. 
 123. See id. at 14-15 (concluding that the cumulative effect of the discrimination 
the appellant had experienced as a result of his race rose to the level of persecution, 
and would continue were he and his family to return to the Czech Republic). 
 124. Id. at 14. 
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An oft-criticized RSAA case125 concerned a Dalit couple from 
India who also presented an account of past systemic 
discrimination.126 The RSAA determined that they would likely 
encounter employment-related difficulties and occasional 
discrimination in accessing health care, and that they would return to 
live in basic housing conditions. However, because India had “taken 
steps to address the de jure and de facto discrimination against Dalits 
and [was] taking steps to progressively realise their rights under the 
ICESCR,” there was no failure of state protection.127 This was 
despite the fact that the RSAA recognized that Dalits “remained 
discriminated against in every aspect of their lives and remain the 
victims of violence.”128 It was also acknowledged that between 1961 
and 1991, the gap in the literacy rate between Dalits and non-Dalits 
narrowed only slightly.129 Additionally, there had been “selective 
installation in many villages of electricity, sanitation and safe 
drinking water which bypass[ed] Dalit areas.”130  
The RSAA emphasized other such small improvements in their 
socio-economic condition. For example:  
[W]hile the number of Dalits in poverty increased by 5 per 
cent as a result of the economic policies of the government 
between 1987 and 1993, this reversed a declining trend of the 
previous 15 years.  This 15 year reduction in Dalit poverty 
suggests economic and social policies designed to benefit 




 125. See, e.g., FOSTER, supra note 110, at 108 n.87 (criticizing the RSAA for 
evaluating the “wrong question” when it failed to focus on whether the state was 
able to shield the parties from the fear of being persecuted). 
 126. See generally Refugee Appeal No. 75221 (Sept. 23, 2005) (N.Z. Refugee 
Status App. Auth.), available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_ 
20050923_75221.pdf (holding that the appellants were not refugees within the 
meaning of the Refugee Convention). 
 127. Id. ¶¶ 121, 141. 
 128. Id. ¶ 119. 
 129. Id. ¶ 120. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. ¶ 122 (recognizing that there is no indication that recent poverty 
increases were the result of a state’s “deliberately retrogressive measures”). 
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In contrast is another RSAA decision132 that appears to focus on 
the correct question: whether the state’s ability to protect is such that 
it eliminates the “well-founded fear of being persecuted.”133 The 
appellants were a Roma family from Hungary. The RSAA 
acknowledged various government reforms intended to improve the 
situation of the Roma and combat the discrimination directed at 
them,134 but recognized that instances of discrimination, as well as 
negative stereotypes, remained prevalent in various dimensions of 
the group’s social life.135 A report of the European Centre for 
Minority Issues (“ECMI”) records the overall discrimination that the 
Roma face: 
One of the primary problems the Roma have to face is 
prejudice. The Roma are generally considered by others to be 
a dirty, lazy and stupid people who are prone to crime. That 
they are often active in the black market and prostitution and 
are disproportionately involved in recorded crimes 
perpetuates the stereotype. However, the poor economic 
status of the Roma, which is at least partially due to these 
prejudices, is to a great extent responsible for this level of 
engagement in crime. The Roma have all the characteristics 
of an economic underclass. They tend to have high levels of 
unemployment, sometimes reaching 80 to 90 per cent. They 
usually live in poor housing, often dwelling in a ghetto-like 




 132. See Refugee Appeal No. 75498-75501 (June 16, 2006) (N.Z. Refugee 
Status App. Auth.),  available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_ 
20060616_75498.pdf (rejecting four appellants’ claims that they had faced 
sufficient discrimination to constitute persecution and warrant refugee status). 
 133. See FOSTER, supra note 110, at 108 n.87 (contending that Refugee Appeal 
No. 75221, for example, incorrectly disregarded the question of state protection). 
 134. See Refugee Appeal No. 75498-75501, ¶¶ 108-09 (June 16, 2006) (citing a 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance report that indicates that the 
Hungarian government made positive efforts at multiple levels of society, but that 
problems remained in many areas). 
 135. See id. ¶ 140 (specifying the existence of police ill-treatment, unequal 
justice, and socio-economic discrimination against the Roma). 
 136. Jonathan Fox, Patterns of Discrimination, Grievances and Political Activity 
Among Europe’s Roma: A Cross-Sectional Analysis J. ETHNOPOLITICS & 
MINORITY ISSUES EUROPE, Winter 2001/2002, at 3. 
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Ultimately, the appellants’ claim was unsuccessful, as the 
consequences of the discrimination, even considered cumulatively, 
did not reach the level of seriousness required to constitute “being 
persecuted.”137 This shows the high threshold that must be overcome 
in social and economic cases, given the degradation that the Roma 
face, as demonstrated by country information similar to the ECMI 
report above. However, the methodology of the RSAA in this case 
was sounder in principle than that of Refugee Appeal No. 75221, 
which appeared to apply what Michelle Foster terms a “due 
diligence” approach.138 This means that the court focuses on the 
effort the state has expended, “rather than an ability to remove the 
well founded fear altogether.”139 This latter case is also consistent 
with the emerging trend noted by Michelle Foster, namely that states 
are showing an increasing willingness to view critically state 
attempts to fulfil core obligations, even in cases “where the state has 
failed to provide a basic right (as opposed to having actively 
withdrawn it).”140   
Internationally speaking, recent claims have been founded on 
discrimination in education and healthcare, which represents a 
developing jurisprudence of considerable significance. Another area 
where reform is desirable, and may be possible through the UDHR 
and its accompanying human rights approach, must be mentioned as 
a final act before concluding this article.  
It may be recalled that within the hierarchy of rights there are 
certain UDHR rights commonly held to fall outside the ambit of a 
state’s duties, therefore not constituting a basis for the existence of 
persecution.141 One such right is Article 17(2) of the UDHR, the right 
 
 137. See Refugee Appeal No. 75498-75501, ¶¶ 180 (June 16, 2006) 
(recognizing, however, an expectation of some risk of discrimination and racism 
upon return to Hungary). 
 138. FOSTER, supra note 110, at 108 n.87. 
 139. Id. (conceding that this may occasionally lead to courts denying refugee 
claims on the basis that the state is “doing its best” to eradicate the discrimination). 
 140. Id. at 203 (underscoring that the court need not evaluate “whether the state 
has ‘done enough’” in these instances) (emphasis added). 
 141. See Refugee Appeal No. 72558/01, ¶ 143 (Nov. 19, 2002) (N.Z. Refugee 
Status App. Auth. ), available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/ 
Ref_20021119_72558.pdf (adopting Hathaway’s characterization of the right to 
own private property as among those rights that are beyond a state’s duty to 
protect). 
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not to be arbitrarily deprived of property.142 Michelle Foster has 
questioned the rigid application of the human rights hierarchy in this 
context, as it may be inappropriate in the case of an applicant 
dispossessed of his or her home, or facing such potential 
dispossession.143 Such an individual is in fact being denied the 
manifestation of an important right: the right to an adequate standard 
of living.144  
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This article has sought to elucidate the role of the UDHR in the 
service of human dignity. To that end, the UDHR’s objectives were 
explained and its formation critically examined. Subsequent sections 
were arranged with a view to evaluate both praise and past criticism 
of the UDHR. This was done through an examination of the UDHR 
in a concrete sense, namely the way it plays out in an area of 
practical application: refugee status determination.  
Today, 60 years after the launch of the UDHR, it continues to have 
a real impact in the protection of vulnerable asylum-seekers. The 
rights enshrined in the UDHR operate as guiding principles for 
refugee decision-makers in many states around the world every day 
through their application of the human rights approach to 
determining the existence of persecution.145  
The UDHR will retain international legal relevance for many years 
to come because it has the proven ability to continue to develop real 
accessible rights. The amazing expansion of social, economic and 
cultural rights in the last decade is a testament to this. Refugee 
decision-makers, using the principles of the UDHR, have become 
increasingly bold in holding states accountable to their obligations 
under the UDHR and its companion agreements, the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR. In this sense, the UDHR is a living instrument. The 
UDHR’s ability to develop the realization of economic and social 
 
 142. UDHR, supra note 4, art. 17(2). 
 143. See FOSTER, supra note 110, at 147 (explaining that such a rigid approach 
fails to take into consideration the specific circumstances faced by the applicant at 
issue). 
 144. See id. at 147-48 (warning that this situation is especially detrimental to 
women, who may continue to face discrimination in inheritance and ownership 
laws, ultimately resulting in “severe economic deprivation”). 
 145. See Refugee Convention, supra note 4, pmbl. (invoking the UDHR). 
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rights allows it to meet the priority of Third World societies: basic 
economic and social needs. This also allows the UDHR to meet the 
criticisms of those who advocate cultural relativism.  
The UDHR has the potential to enhance its already significant 
ability to create norms and thus shape the practical protection of the 
world’s peoples. There is a category of rights within the UDHR that 
is as yet unenforceable, but with the potential to protect those who 
have been denied the ultimate dignity of shelter and the subsequent 
ability to maintain an adequate standard of living. If basic rights such 
as these can be accessed in a real and substantive way, such as to 
avoid labels like ‘rhetoric’ or ‘aspirational,’ then there can be no 
other result than the augmentation and the intensification of the sum 
dignity of humankind.   
 
 
 
